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MAGNA CARTA FOR THE WORLD? THE 
MERCHANTS’ CHAPTER AND FOREIGN 
CAPITAL IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC* 
DANIEL HULSEBOSCH** 
All merchants may safely and securely go out of England, and 
come into England, and delay and pass through England, as well 
by land as by water, for the purpose of buying and selling, free 
from all evil taxes, subject to the ancient and right customs—save 
in time of war, and if they are of the land at war against us. And 
if such be found in our land at the beginning of the war, they 
shall be held, without harm to their bodies and goods, until it 
shall be known to us or our chief justice how the merchants of 
our land are to be treated who shall, at that time, be found in the 
land at war against us. And if ours shall be safe there, the others 
shall be safe in our land. 
  —MAGNA CARTA CH. 41/30, “THE MERCHANTS’ 
CHAPTER”1 
   
 
 *  © 2016 Daniel Hulsebosch. 
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November 2015; and the Tel Aviv University Law School Legal History Workshop, 
December 2015. The author is especially grateful for comments from Alfred Brophy, 
Richard Epstein, Joshua Getzler, David Golove, Paul Halliday, Ron Harris, Roy Kreitner, 
Adam Lebovitz, Doreen Lustig, Uday Mehta, James Pfander, Steve Pincus, and Nicholas 
Vincent. He is also grateful for the support of the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. 
Greenberg Faculty Research Fund, N.Y.U. School of Law. 
 1. MAGNA CARTA ch. 41 (1215), reprinted and translated in SELECT HISTORICAL 
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 135, 142 (Ernest F. Henderson ed. & trans., New 
York 1965). It is chapter 41 in the original 1215 charter and chapter 30 in the so-called 
statutory version of 1225. Relying on Sir Edward Coke’s seventeenth-century translation 
as their source, most eighteenth-century commentators cited the 1225 version. See, e.g., 
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 
30, at *57. 
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This Article examines the early modern revival and subtle 
transformation in what is here called the merchants’ chapter of 
Magna Carta and then analyzes how lawyers, judges, and 
government officeholders invoked it in the new American federal 
courts and in debates over congressional power. In the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the early 1790s, a British creditor and an 
American State debated the meaning and applicability of the 
merchants’ chapter, which guaranteed two rights to foreign 
merchants: free entry and exit during peacetime, without being 
subjected to arbitrary taxes; and, in wartime, the promise that 
their persons and goods would not be harmed or confiscated, 
unless their own king attacked and confiscated English 
merchants. In other words, no harm to enemy aliens, except as 
retaliation. Tit for tat. 
The idea that reciprocity was a fundamental mechanism of 
international (and interpersonal) relations became something 
like a social science axiom in the early modern Enlightenment. 
Edward Coke claimed to find that mechanism in the merchants’ 
chapter and publicized it to lawyers throughout the emerging 
British Empire and beyond. Montesquieu lauded the English for 
protecting foreign commerce in their fundamental law, and 
Blackstone basked in that praise. American lawyers derived their 
understanding of the merchants’ chapter from these sources and 
then, in the early Republic, stretched the principle behind it to 
protect foreign capital, not just resident merchants. The 
vindication of old imperial debt contracts would signal to all 
international creditors that, in the United States, credit was safe. 
Federalists then invoked the chapter outside of the courts to resist 
Republican attempts to embargo commerce and sequester foreign 
credit. For Republicans, doux commerce had become the 
Achilles heel of the great Atlantic empires: their reliance on 
American trade could be used to gain diplomatic leverage 
without risking war. For Federalists, economic sanctions 
threatened not just their fiscal policy but their entire vision of an 
Atlantic world that increasingly insulated international capital 
from national politics. They all agreed, however, that the role of 
foreign capital in the American constitutional system was a 
central issue for the new and developing nation. 
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I.  PLEADING ENGLISH RIGHTS IN POST-COLONIAL AMERICA 
Magna Carta appears in the strangest places. Mythical figures 
often do. Broad relevance and persistence are central to their 
mystique. Yet omnipresence also strains credulity. For lawyers, at 
least, a legal myth’s power is usually taken for granted, and the 
pertinent questions concern what the myth means, whether it applies 
to the problem at hand, and, if so, how. Historians, on the other hand, 
ask questions of epistemology and effect rather than exegesis: Why 
did those historical actors think it was useful to invoke the myth at 
that moment, what work did they want it to accomplish, and did they 
succeed? Why, for example, did American judges and lawyers invoke 
one chapter of Magna Carta, what here is called “the merchants’ 
chapter,” in one of the earliest cases to reach the Supreme Court of 
the United States? 
The short answer is international credit—in all senses of that 
term. In the early 1790s, the U.S. Supreme Court tried a case between 
the state of Georgia and a foreign British merchant who had extended 
credit to a colonist before the American Revolution.2 The legal 
dispute began in 1791 when the British creditor, Samuel Brailsford, 
 
 2. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 1–2 (1794). Many primary source 
documents for this case are published in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 
Columbia Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter 6 DHSC].  
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sought to collect that seventeen-year-old debt and sued his debtor, 
James Spalding, directly in the Federal Circuit Court.3 Brailsford had 
sold Spalding a “cargo” of slaves in 1774; in return Spalding had 
tendered a bond valued, in 1791, at over seven thousand pounds.4 
Brailsford’s attorney pleaded in the Federal Circuit Court that the 
plaintiffs were “aliens, and subjects of his Britannick Majesty,” 
providing jurisdiction on the basis of the court’s alienage jurisdiction.5 
The substantive rule of decision, according to the plaintiffs, was the 
Treaty of Peace of 1783, which provided that both sides would place 
“no lawful impediment[s]” in the way of debt collection.6 Despite its 
formal equality, everyone knew this was a one-way provision: 
Americans owed millions of pounds to Britons stemming from pre-
revolutionary mercantile debt, not vice versa.7 
Attorneys for the debtor argued instead that the State had 
confiscated all debts owed to Britons, whether it had actually 
collected the money from patriot debtors or not.8 Confiscations 
 
 3. Brailsford sued on behalf of himself and two partners, Robert William Powell and 
John Hopton. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 74. Spalding in turn was the named plaintiff in an 
action against him and partners Roger Kelsall and Job Cockton. Id. Two different sections 
of the Georgia confiscation statute of 1782 covered Brailsford, on the one hand, and his 
partners, on the other. One section affected debts owed by Georgia citizens, like Spalding, 
to British creditors, like Brailsford. The other covered property owned and debts owing in 
Georgia to persons whose property was confiscated in other states, like South Carolina. 
This section covered the other two partners, who were stipulated to be South Carolina 
citizens. See id. at 86. 
 4. Id. at 74 & n.7. Liberal sales of goods on credit characterized imperial trade 
before the Revolution. See, e.g., JACOB M. PRICE, CAPITAL AND CREDIT IN BRITISH 
OVERSEAS TRADE: THE VIEW FROM THE CHESAPEAKE, 1700–1776, at 13–17 (1980) 
(discussing debt and credit in colonial America). 
 5. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 74; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §	9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. 
Whether all or some of the plaintiffs were actually aliens is historically unclear, but as a 
legal matter, the parties ultimately agreed that Brailsford, who went from the colonies to 
Britain in 1767 and evidently remained there during the war, was an alien. 6 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 74–75. The federal courts concluded that Powell and Hopton, however, were 
South Carolina citizens who had become Loyalists. Id. at 75. The difference between those 
whom the new Americans classified as “real British Subjects” (in the words of Article V of 
the Treaty of Peace) and those they classified as state citizens who turned Loyalist is a 
knotty historical problem, especially when applied to people who were not born in the 
colonies but who resided in them for many years before the Revolution. The 
distinguishing feature of Brailsford’s biography seems to have been that he left the 
colonies well before the Revolution; the others fled after it began. 
 6. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82. 
 7. See id. For the problem of debts in the making of the Constitution and the early 
federal courts, see Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the Federal Circuit 
Court of Virginia, 1790 to 1797, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 176, 180–83 (1984); 
Brent Tarter & Wythe Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand Juries in 
Virginia, 1789–1809, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 259–60 (2007). 
 8. See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. 
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completed during the war, they argued, were not the postwar 
impediments envisioned by the treaty-makers. Georgia then 
interpleaded in the cause to supplant the British creditor, claiming 
that it owned the debt.9 
A case between a British creditor and an American State 
commencing in 1791 and dealing with the messy legal aftermath of the 
Revolution seems an unlikely place to find Magna Carta. But there it 
was: the parties debated the relevance of the second part of the 
merchants’ chapter, safeguarding foreign merchants and their goods 
during war, unless their own governments targeted resident English 
merchants. In other words, no harm to enemy aliens except as 
retaliation. Tit for tat. Attorneys for the creditor and at least two 
judges invoked the merchants’ chapter to help find that Georgia—
despite the State’s protests—had not confiscated British debts during 
the war. They attributed to Georgia’s wartime legislators a desire to 
treat British creditors reciprocally, as American creditors were 
treated in Britain, and supposed that the merchants’ chapter had 
influenced the legislators’ decision. In fact, Britain had not 
confiscated debts owed to Americans during the war. Ergo, Georgia 
refrained as well. 
The idea that reciprocity was a fundamental mechanism of 
international (and interpersonal) relations became something like a 
social science axiom in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.10 It was 
central to this federal debt case, the participants’ reading of Magna 
Carta, and many Americans’ understanding of their constitutional 
and commercial environment in the political branches as well as the 
courts. Attorney General William Bradford argued that the 
merchants’ chapter stood for the proposition “[t]hat the faith of 
 
 9. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 76. The defendant debtor did not consent, which created 
a knotty legal problem: could a third-party claimant interplead into an action at common 
law against the defendant’s will? The blackletter answer was no. See id. at 77. That is why 
the State moved in equity. However, most of the judges believed that the State did not 
satisfy the requirements for an equitable remedy because a satisfactory legal remedy 
remained: it could await the outcome of the suit between the creditor and debtor, and if 
the creditor won, it could sue the creditor. See id. at 83. However, Georgia feared that the 
debtor would not adequately protect the State’s interest and that the British creditor 
would leave the country with his damages before it could sue. See id. These two factors 
swayed the Justices, and the Supreme Court permitted the State to interplead and 
effectively take over the defense of the debtor’s position. See id. at 77–84. 
 10. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL 
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 48–56 (1977); ISTVAN HONT, 
JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NATION-STATE IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6–8 (2005). 
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Commercial intercourse ought not to be violated.”11 What was at 
stake was not just past promises. The vindication of old debt contracts 
would, he argued, also ensure the “[p]rospect of future Credit.”12 
Scrupulous repayment would signal to lenders across the Atlantic 
that, in the United States, credit was safe. In reply, attorneys for the 
debtor and State, one of whom was unofficial court reporter 
Alexander Dallas, argued that the laws of war recognized the power 
of confiscation, regardless of what Magna Carta might prohibit in 
Britain, and the sovereign State of Georgia had exercised that 
power.13 The law of nations was not univocal on the question of 
whether belligerent nations could confiscate private debts: as a matter 
of state practice and treaty commitments, nations were increasingly 
reluctant to do so; and eighteenth-century jurists had begun to 
question the right.14 Still, traditional authority firmly supported a 
belligerent’s right to confiscate enemy debt along with other personal 
property located in its jurisdiction. The important point for Georgia 
was that the early modern law of nations was the relevant source of 
law, not the medieval fundament of England’s ancient constitution. 
During the war, Georgia was an independent nation rather than a 
province of England. 
No one argued that Magna Carta alone was binding law. Instead, 
its adherents argued that it provided persuasive authority for a pro-
commercial interpretation of Georgia’s revolutionary confiscation 
statute and the peace treaty’s protection of debts. As Supreme Court 
Justice James Iredell put it when holding that the British creditor 
retained a right to collect the debt: “[Magna Carta is] dear to all 
 
 11. William Bradford, Jr.’s Notes for Argument in the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1794), 
reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 158, 165. Bradford and, in an earlier stage of 
litigation, Attorney General Edmund Randolph did not participate in their official 
capacity as executive officers. Instead, they represented the British creditor as part of their 
private practice. However, Associate Justice Iredell early on alerted President George 
Washington and Randolph to the gravity of the case, and Randolph and Bradford typically 
participated only in the highest profile cases as private attorneys while in office. 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800, 
at 239–42, 242 n.5 (1988). The case also raised tricky procedural issues surrounding 
Georgia’s interpleader into the original suit between Brailsford and his debtors. See 
Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 416–18 (1793); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 402, 406–07 (1792). 
 12. William Bradford, Jr.’s Notes for Argument in the Supreme Court, supra note 11, 
at 165. 
 13. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 134–35 (noting that Georgia’s attorney invoked Vattel 
for the proposition that “[a] Sovereign has a right to confiscate Debts or any real or 
personal Estate”). 
 14. See infra notes 115, 133–49 (referring to Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in The 
Defence). 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016) 
2016] MAGNA CARTA FOR THE WORLD? 1605 
Friends of Liberty, in which our Ancestors and those of the present 
Inhabitants of Great Britain had a common participation, and which 
in many of its parts we still cherish with the highest veneration.”15 
Even in revolution, England’s ancient constitution informed 
American constitutionalism. Shifting to the laws of war, Iredell 
acknowledged that many authorities on the law of nations recognized 
a belligerent’s power to confiscate debts in wartime; nonetheless, the 
trend within the law of nations, in both practice and jurisprudence, 
was toward forbidding confiscation.16 
Soon after, the merchants’ chapter played another cameo role in 
political debates over the degree to which this self-consciously 
developing nation should use economic sanctions as diplomatic 
weapons against the stronger Atlantic empires.17 When nascent 
Jeffersonian Republicans proposed embargoes and debt 
sequestration in retaliation against the belligerents involved in the 
wars of the French Revolution, which were harassing neutral trade on 
the high seas, Alexander Hamilton invoked the merchants’ chapter, 
along with the liberal trend of the law of nations condemning debt 
confiscation, as sources of an implied constitutional limitation against 
the sequestration of debt.18 The Anglo-American Jay Treaty of 1794 
then explicitly prohibited debt sequestration as a diplomatic tool in 
 
 15. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion (May 2, 1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 102, 105. Technically, Iredell gave this Circuit Court decision in the contest 
between the creditor and the individual debtor, but Georgia was already seeking to 
interplead. In a suggestive account, Thomas H. Lee argues that chapter 41 of Magna Carta 
influenced the passage of the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 now known as the Alien 
Tort Statute, which provides federal court jurisdiction in “all causes where an alien sues 
for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States.” 
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
830, 837 (2006); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §	9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. But he does not 
provide evidence that the drafters or users of that statute invoked the chapter. 
 16. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra note 15, at 106. 
 17. The United States is sometimes seen as the first developing nation or “first new 
nation.” See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES 
IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 15 (1963); RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE 
EMERGING NATIONS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 (1970). Its priority, however, 
depends on the definition of a “developing nation.” The Netherlands, while gaining 
independence from Spain, for example, shared some features of early America, including 
its innovative banking system, which Hamilton deliberately imitated. However, the 
Netherlands possessed much internal capital. Post-revolutionary Americans, on the other 
hand, needed to lure foreign capital. Much of early American legal and constitutional 
history can therefore be understood as a series of institutional experiments designed to 
attract foreign investment while also preserving political freedom of action. This is a major 
theme in my forthcoming book with David Golove, A CIVILIZED NATION: WAR AND 
TRADE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1815 
(forthcoming). 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 133–37. 
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war or peace.19 In constitutional debates in the political branches as 
well as in the courts, the merchants’ chapter remained alive as a 
source of constitutional morality. 
Magna Carta had earlier become part of imperial constitutional 
myth. Colonists had invoked it when proclaiming the principles of no 
taxation without representation and trial by jury.20 The 
revolutionaries drew on the so-called due process provision of Magna 
Carta when writing state constitutions during the war.21 Now, after 
political separation, that transatlantic myth still informed American 
constitutional argument. It shaded the interpretation of a 
revolutionary statute, giving the federal judges authority to bend the 
law away from Georgia’s immediate fiscal interest and toward what 
Federalists saw as international credit for the whole nation over the 
long term. The upshot was that the British creditor could collect from 
his American debtor. And if Georgia had already collected money 
from patriotic citizens who owed old debts to British merchants, the 
implication was that British creditors could sue Georgia too. 
Two aspects of this use of Magna Carta in the 1790s are 
noteworthy. First, Magna Carta not only escaped England—it 
escaped the British Empire into the post-colonial United States. 
Second, and more interesting, Magna Carta had never been solely 
concerned with the rights of Englishmen, imperial subjects, or even 
Anglo-Americans. From the beginning it contained some rights for 
foreign merchants—for “strangers” and “aliens,” in the legal terms of 
medieval and early modern England. Most scholars and lawyers can 
 
 19. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. X, 
Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 122. 
 20. Colonial Americans linked the representation principle to Magna Carta articles 12 
and 14, and they framed their objection to juryless courts, distant venues, and innovative 
statutory law in the language of due process that resonated with article 29. See EDMUND S. 
MORGAN, PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP 
ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 52 (1959) (reproducing colonial petitions objecting to the Stamp 
Act as violating Magna Carta); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 166–67, 232–33 (1986) 
(discussing the revolutionaries’ invocation of Magna Carta). 
 21. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39, reprinted and translated in SELECT HISTORICAL 
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 1, at 142 (providing that “[n]o freeman 
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed—
nor will we go upon or send upon him—save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the 
law of the land”); see, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XII (stating that “no subject shall be 
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, put 
out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the 
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land”); PA. CONST. of 1776, §	9 (providing that no 
one can “be justly deprived of his liberty, except by the laws of the land or judgment of his 
peers”); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §	8 (1776) (providing that “no man be deprived 
of his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers”). 
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intuit how Americans grabbed hold of the medieval charter and made 
it their own. But how did aliens enter the picture?  
The fact that Magna Carta, a document often portrayed as the 
“birthright”22 of native Englishmen, actually protected the rights of 
foreigners is significant.23 More important is the fact that Sir Edward 
Coke attached a pro-commercial gloss to the chapter in the 
seventeenth century, and Enlightenment thinkers like Montesquieu 
and Sir William Blackstone celebrated that interpretation in the 
generation before the American Revolution. All of their books were 
widely available in America and cited in the new federal courts. 
This Article examines the early modern revival of and subtle 
transformation in the merchants’ chapter and then analyzes how 
lawyers, judges, and government officeholders invoked it in both the 
new American federal courts and debates over congressional power. 
Part II investigates the early modern sources available to Americans 
that shaped their understanding of the merchants’ chapter. Part III 
analyzes the Brailsford case in the federal courts, particularly how 
lawyers and judges used the chapter to help interpret wartime 
confiscation statutes. Part III then turns to debates in the political 
branches about foreign capital, focusing on Jeffersonian Republican 
proposals to introduce economic sanctions as a new mechanism of 
diplomacy and, in response, Alexander Hamilton’s invocation of the 
merchants’ chapter in his interpretation of the protections of foreign 
capital under the Constitution and the law of nations. The Article 
concludes by suggesting that the career of the merchants’ chapter in 
the early United States indicates the ways it was a fiscal-commercial 
state. 
 
 22. Edward Coke repeatedly used the term “birthright” to describe key sections of 
Magna Carta, but as shown below, Coke also recognized the extra-national dimension of 
other clauses. For a characteristically nativist and enormously influential interpretation of 
Magna Carta as the cornerstone of the early modern English Constitution, see HENRY 
CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE (5th ed., 
Boston 1721). Many editions followed, including many printed in British America. 
 23. It should not surprise medievalists familiar with pre-national legal doctrines in 
Europe. It nonetheless surprises some historians of the document: “That alien merchants 
were aware of chapter 30 and its value to them is apparent from an episode of 1320, odd as 
it seems to hear an appeal to the Charter from men bearing the names of Bonus Philippi, 
Dinus Forcetti, and Manenttus Francisci!” FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE 
IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 111 (1948) (emphasis 
added). 
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II.  THE MERCHANTS’ CHAPTER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: 
COKE, MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE 
This Article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive history 
of the merchants’ chapter between 1215 and the American 
Revolution. Instead it explores how American lawyers and judges 
understood the merchants’ chapter. When they looked back at Magna 
Carta, what did they see? Through what lenses and against what 
background did they evaluate Magna Carta? Americans did not have 
access to some ideal, objective history of the chapter, nor any part of 
Magna Carta. That did not exist then (if ever it could). They also did 
not have access to the bulk of medieval and early modern legal 
learning about Magna Carta, because that was largely contained in 
manuscript cases and readings in the English Inns of Court, much of 
which is only now being recovered by historians.24 Americans did, 
however, have ready access to the canonical printed texts of English 
law, such as Sir Edward Coke’s seventeenth-century Institutes of the 
Law of England and Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, published in the decade before the Revolution. In 
addition, they possessed many copies of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the 
Laws, a popular Enlightenment text and the most influential book on 
comparative legal and governmental institutions for generations. In 
these widely circulating texts, Americans found impeccable authority 
for connecting international commerce to fundamental law.25 Indeed, 
the nexus was, according to these writers, a progressive catalyst for 
human civilization. 
A. Edward Coke and “Merchant Strangers” 
Although it is wrong to say that the prolific early seventeenth-
century jurist Edward Coke rescued Magna Carta from medieval 
obscurity,26 he did translate it from Latin and gloss it in influential, if 
 
 24. Prominently, by Sir John Baker. See generally Sir John H. Baker, Lecture at a 
Meeting of the American Inns of Court Foundation in Washington D.C.: Magna Carta: 
The Emergence of the Myth, Presented at the N.Y.U. Legal and Constitutional History 
Colloquium (Oct. 23, 2015) (on file with author). According to Baker, there does not 
appear to have been a stand-alone reading, or learned lecture, on the merchants’ chapter, 
as there was for the more famous chapter 29 guaranteeing due process according to the 
law of the land. At least, such a reading has not so far been discovered. See id. 
 25. On the availability of legal texts before and after the Revolution, see Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch, An Empire of Law: Chancellor Kent and the Revolution in Books in the Early 
Republic, 60 ALA. L. REV. 377 (2009). 
 26. This was more or less Edward Jenks’s view. See Edward Jenks, The Myth of 
Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 260, 272–73 (1904). But see Max Radin, The Myth of Magna 
Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060–62 (1947) (arguing against Jenks’s view). 
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not historically faithful, ways. Coke devoted the second volume of his 
Institutes of the Laws of England to an examination of “many ancient 
and other statutes.”27 He began with Magna Carta, which he observed 
was called the Great Charter not because of its size (other statutes 
were longer) but rather because of “the great importance, and 
weightinesse of the matter.”28 The Magna Carta that emerged from 
Coke’s second Institutes, published posthumously during the English 
Civil War, was no longer a charter of barons. It was the touchstone of 
national liberties.29 
Yet for a writer so long charged with intellectual parochialism, 
his treatment of the merchants’ chapter is surprisingly catholic. “The 
end of this chapter was for advancement of trade, and traffique,” 
Coke wrote in his gloss, “the meanes for the well using, and intreating 
of merchant strangers in all the particulars aforesaid, is a matter of 
great moment	.	.	.	for as they be used here, so our merchants shall be 
dealt withall in other countries.”30 Glossing another chapter, Coke 
maintained that 
trade and traffique is the livelihood of a merchant, and the life 
of the commonwealth, wherein the king and every subject hath 
interest, for the merchant is the good bayliffe of the realme to 
export and vent the native commodities of the realme, and to 
import and bring in the necessary commodities for the defence 
and benefit of the realme.31 
Here, as elsewhere, Coke pushed English jurisprudence toward 
economic openness and experimentation.32 
Two striking concepts emerge in Coke’s treatment of the rights 
of what he called “merchant strangers.”33 First, rights for foreigners in 
England would induce reciprocal treatment for English merchants 
abroad. Second, the merchants were not just a private interest group. 
Instead, they could be analogized to public servants—bailiffs—who in 
Coke’s period were sheriffs’ assistants who executed the writs that 
began litigation and enforced the judgments that ended it. Coke 
 
 27. COKE, supra note 1, at title page. 
 28. Id. at *A4. 
 29. For the reinvention of Magna Carta among common lawyers in Coke’s 
generation, see Baker, supra note 24. 
 30. COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30, at *58. 
 31. Id. ch. 14, at *28. 
 32. For Coke’s economic liberalism, see Donald O. Wagner, Coke and the Rise of 
Economic Liberalism, 6 ECON. HIST. REV. 30 (1935). 
 33. COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30, at *57. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016) 
1610 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
defined bailiff as “a safe keeper or protector.”34 So too were 
merchants: with them lay the health, welfare, and defense of the 
realm. 
Therefore, it was in England’s interest to protect merchant 
strangers because that protection would be reciprocated abroad. It is 
a surprisingly sociable premise for a jurist so long associated with 
jealous concern for England and aversion to everything continental.35 
There is some of that national exceptionalism in Coke’s account of 
the chapter’s origins and effects. Coke implied that the merchants’ 
chapter was a work of English genius, not a fragment of a common 
European culture.36 Once issued, other nations would respond to 
what England did and open their trade to match the openness of 
England. So England was pushing to open up trade among the 
European nations. 
Coke extended the obvious reciprocal dynamic of the chapter’s 
second right, covering merchants in wartime, to the peacetime right to 
be free of arbitrary taxes. More trade would benefit England, but 
trade required openness—not just domestic openness, as in his 
crusade against royal monopolies,37 but also openness to international 
trade. The grant of rights—here, rights to foreign merchants—
generated strength for the whole nation. In a fundamental insight lost 
on many modern theorists of liberty and the liberal state, Coke saw 
that liberty does not necessarily trade off from power. Liberty helps 
generate power. Liberal trade, not war, would build the state through 
the strength of its subjects. A liberal state requires tremendous 
 
 34. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND ch. 10, §	79, at *61b–62a. 
 35. See generally RICHARD HELGERSON, FORMS OF NATIONHOOD: THE 
ELIZABETHAN WRITING OF ENGLAND 88–101 (1992) (discussing Coke’s legacy in English 
legal thought); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 
(1957) (discussing English constitutionalism in the seventeenth century). 
 36. For countering views, see R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999) (suggesting the merchants’ chapter was influenced by ius 
commune); infra Section II.C (discussing Blackstone’s gloss of Magna Carta). Helmholz 
shows that the merchants’ chapter was not wholly innovative in substance but of course 
cannot demonstrate the direct influence on the drafters. See also Thomas J. McSweeney, 
Magna Carta, Civil Law, and Canon Law, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW 
281, 283 (Daniel Barstow Magraw et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the language of ius 
commune was useful to drafters attempting to translate local grievances into forms legible 
abroad, particularly in Rome). 
 37. See Darcy v. Allein (1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.); Jacob I. Corré, The 
Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1262–66 (1996). 
Coke also located the antimonopoly principle in chapter 30: “all monopolies concerning 
trade and traffique, are against the liberty and freedome, declared and graunted by this 
great charter, and against divers other acts of parliament	.	.	.	.” COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30, 
at *62. 
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authority if it is to challenge lesser authorities within it and vindicate 
what Coke repeatedly called “liberty of the subject.”38 In turn, the 
increasing wealth of those subjects contributed to state power. Coke 
was not known for high-level abstraction. His jurisprudence was 
deeply, sometimes fantastically, empirical.39 In this instance, however, 
he developed a functional analysis that went well beyond that 
suggested in the text of Magna Carta. 
The premise of his pre-Englightenment conception of 
international relations might be called a realist sociability. Coke did 
not write of the sweetness of commerce. He did not posit a natural 
affinity of humans across political boundaries such that, even in the 
state of nature, they congregated instinctively and not just for the 
functional purpose of improving their solitary, nasty, brutish, and 
short lives. Instead, he assumed that trade was good because it 
increased wealth for the English nation, and an effective way to foster 
it was to permit foreign merchants into England. The reputation of 
England’s openness would be reported abroad and encourage 
reciprocation. At least since the middle ages, a kingdom could obtain 
reciprocal treatment for merchants in a treaty.40 Coke suggested that 
a nation could achieve that treatment even without a formal 
agreement by unilaterally lowering trade barriers. For Coke, the 
merchants’ chapter did not reflect an interest-group struggle between 
barons seeking foreign luxury goods and jealous domestic merchants 
who wanted all trade to themselves.41 Instead, he assumed that there 
could be gains from trade on both sides. He also recognized that 
foreign merchants did not just sell; they also bought English goods, 
leaving specie payment behind and benefiting England’s balance of 
 
 38. This was one of Coke’s signature terms. See, e.g., 3 COMMONS DEBATES 1628, at 
167 (Robert C. Johnson et al. eds., 1977) (Coke reporting from a “committee appointed to 
frame a bill concerning the liberty of the subject”). 
 39. See, e.g., COKE, supra note 1, ch. 1, at *3 (“[T]his charter is declaratory of the 
ancient law and liberty of England, and therefore no new freedom is hereby 
granted	.	.	.	but a restitution of such as lawfully they had before, and to free them of that 
which had been usurped and incroached upon them by any power whatsoever	.	.	.	.”); id. 
ch. 2, at *8 (“Lastly, this chapter of Magna Charta is but a restitution and declaration of 
the ancient common law	.	.	.	.”). 
 40. See W.S. Culbertson, Commercial Treaties, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 24, 25 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., MacMillan Co., 1931). 
 41. This schematic interest-group interpretation, common a century ago, ignores the 
need of English merchants to interact with foreign merchants in order to gain access to 
their goods and export markets. Coke had not made that mistake. There was, however, 
probably some tension between wholesale merchants and local retailers, which is reflected 
in Magna Carta’s protection of local mercantile privileges, such as London’s “old 
liberties.” MAGNA CARTA ch. 13, reprinted and translated in SELECT HISTORICAL 
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 1, at 135, 139. 
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payments (or at least counterbalancing domestic payments to foreign 
producers).42  
Coke did not elaborate his reasoning, but what he did write does 
not fit comfortably into the categories of mercantilism or liberalism. 
He was committed to benefiting England’s internal economy, while 
also recognizing that foreign merchants would follow both their 
individual interests and their nations’ interests as well. All those 
interests aligned for some purposes. A wise legal system would foster 
mutual gain. For Coke, the medieval charter provided one mechanism 
for promoting that ideal political economy. He was groping toward 
freer if not absolutely free trade, and he argued that legal liberties 
within England, even for aliens, could benefit Englishmen at home 
and abroad. Commercial rights had a diplomatic dimension. Coke was 
of course not himself part of the Enlightenment, the beginnings of 
which historians trace later in the seventeenth century. Here as 
elsewhere, though, he was groping toward new uses of old law. For 
him, the barons’ resistance to King John fit nicely with his and other 
Parliamentarians’ resistance to the Stuart Kings’ claims of power. 
Others might take this resistance out of context, and perhaps even 
deploy it against representative legislatures. 
There were answers to this reasoning. Some of Coke’s 
contemporaries were more skeptical of erasing the conceptual 
boundary between public and private interests. In the eyes of the 
Stuart Kings’ defenders, the realm had common interests that were of 
a different sort altogether from the petty interests of individual 
subjects. At about the same time that Coke equated commerce with 
national welfare, Chief Baron Sir Thomas Fleming rebutted the 
(admittedly different) claim that merchants ought to have 
unrestricted access to foreign markets by stating that “the end of 
every private merchant is not the common good, but his particular 
profit.”43 In contrast, King James’s prerogative taxes, designed to 
obstruct some foreign trade, furthered the public welfare. On this 
account, the private interests of merchants should give way to salus 
populi.44 And it was the king-in-council who was best positioned to 
gauge the common good. Trade regulation was a political matter, 
 
 42. COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30. 
 43. Bates’s Case (1606) 145 Eng. Rep. 267, 272 (Exchequer) (upholding royal, rather 
than parliamentary, impositions on foreign trade). On the constitutional theory beneath 
this prerogative claim, see W. S. Holdsworth, The Prerogative in the Sixteenth Century, 21 
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 559–60 (1921); see also GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE 
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603–
1642, at 140–41 (1992). 
 44. Bates’s Case, 145 Eng. Rep. at 271. 
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centered in the king’s court rather than fragmented in the mercantile 
community or in Parliament. The contrast between and the conflation 
of mercantile interest and public welfare both circulated in English-
speaking political culture at least since the Stuart period. Coke’s 
conception was not alone in crossing the Atlantic. But it was strongly 
stated and influential. Its influence derived in no small part from the 
fact that it comported with many Americans’ own views of the 
centrality of international commerce to the survival of the newly 
independent United States. 
B. The Merchants’ Chapter in the Enlightenment: Montesquieu 
Despite the reservations of other English lawyers, Coke’s 
treatment became the proximate source for Magna Carta and its 
meaning for over a century afterward. That was true especially 
outside the British Empire. Montesquieu, for example, had evidently 
read Coke’s gloss on Magna Carta before drafting Spirit of the Laws 
in 1748. A significant part of that book celebrates the English 
Constitution. One example is the Frenchman’s recapitulation of 
Coke’s version of the merchants’ chapter: “The Magna Charta of 
England forbids the seizing and confiscating, in case of war, the 
effects of foreign merchants, except by way of reprisals,” 
Montesquieu wrote.45 “It is an honor to the English nation that they 
have made this one of the articles of their liberty.”46 The paean came 
in the part of the book that famously celebrates doux commerce. 
Commerce not only diffuses wealth, he argued; it also destroys 
prejudice, softens manners, diffuses learning, and promotes peaceful 
international relations because it makes nations mutually and 
consciously interdependent.47 “Peace,” he declared, “is the natural 
effect of trade.”48 Here Montesquieu moved beyond Coke’s 
 
 45. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XX, §	14, at 324 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., Colonial Press 1900) (1748). Montesquieu’s spelling of Magna Charta, with 
an “h”, suggests the influence of Coke’s treatment of the charter. Coke helped partially 
Anglicize the spelling, and throughout most of the eighteenth century “Charta” was the 
preferred spelling. William Blackstone appears to have begun the reversion to “Carta” in 
his 1759 treatise: WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE GREAT CHARTER AND CHARTER OF THE 
FOREST, WITH OTHER AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS: TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN 
INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY OF THE CHARTERS, at xxix (Oxford, 
Claredon Press 1759).  
 46. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, §	14, at 324. 
 47. Id. bk. XX, §	2, at 316–17. 
 48. Id. bk. XX, §	2, at 316. Montesquieu contrasted Spanish laws penalizing trading 
with the British enemy in the War over the Asiento (also known as the War of Jenkins’ 
Ear). Spain had imposed the death penalty on its merchants who traded with Britain. This 
was uncivilized: 
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calculated and functional reciprocity and posited a utopian human 
sociability. Commerce does not just strengthen individual nations. It 
brings nations together. 
The English had taken the lead. “Other nations have made the 
interests of commerce yield to those of politics,” Montesquieu went 
on to observe, “the English, on the contrary, have ever made their 
political interests give way to those of commerce.”49 Commerce was 
beneficial, and politics should not frustrate it in favor of corrupt, local 
gain. Therefore, commerce should be partially insulated from politics. 
Yet he also warned that a state should never permit unfettered trade, 
which would lead to “slavery.”50 Montesquieu characterized the 
difference between the healthy and detrimental commerce by 
contrasting what he called “economical commerce,” in which 
merchants incessantly pursued small gains, to “commerce of luxury,” 
in which merchants speculated for quick fortunes.51 An economy 
relying on slavery was his example of luxury commerce. A country 
with slavery had fewer commercial restrictions than a free one, but a 
slave-based economy was, in Montesquieu’s view, not the most 
productive.52 The contrast between Britain’s pro-commercial 
regulation of commerce and a slave society’s anti-commercial 
protection of unfettered trade in human beings epitomized for 
Montesquieu the difference between governments that favor 
economical commerce and those that foster unhealthy luxury 
commerce. Slave-based economies sacrificed long-term commercial 
health for short-term gains. Some restrictions on commercial greed 
 
An ordinance like this cannot	.	.	.	find a precedent in any laws but those of Japan. 
[He criticized Japan and China for tightly controlling foreign trade.] It equally 
shocks humanity, the spirit of commerce, and the harmony which ought to subsist 
in the proportion of penalties; it confounds all our ideas, making that a crime 
against the state which is only a violation of civil polity. 
Id. bk. XX, §	14, at 324. Montesquieu seems to have believed that Britain did not 
criminalize trading with the enemy, because, after all, the British let enemy merchants 
remain among them without confiscation. This did not at all follow. He was not aware that 
Britain had its own laws penalizing trade with the enemy, as well as a much-abused 
licensing system for avoiding them. See generally Su Jin Kim & James Oldham, Insuring 
Maritime Trade with the Enemy in the Napoleonic Era, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 561 (2012) 
(discussing Parliamentary statutes prohibiting trade with France and the issuance of 
licenses intended to protect the British economy). 
 49. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, §	7, at 321. 
 50. Id. bk. XX, §	12, at 323. 
 51.  Id. bk. XX, §	4, at 318–19. The latter, he thought, was a species of gambling. Id. 
 52. See id. bk. XV, §	8, at 240–41. 
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and exploitation redounded, in the long run, in favor of commerce.53 
Observing the example of the British Navigation Acts, which forbade 
foreign nations to trade directly with British colonies, Montesquieu 
reasoned, “[t]he English constrain the merchant, but it is in favor of 
commerce.”54 
What Montesquieu meant when he contrasted commerce and 
politics, while retaining space for regulation, is not entirely clear. He 
was famously epigrammatic and analytically pluralist, if not 
inconsistent.55 Commerce could be a force for peace, if well regulated; 
governments should not, however, frustrate commerce; and a well-
balanced constitution would tend to produce the right sort of 
“moderate government.”56 On balance, though, Montesquieu argued 
that politics were national, jealous, and tended toward belligerence. 
Commerce, on the other hand, was international, cosmopolitan, and 
promoted peace. A mixed constitution would produce the right 
balance between policy and commerce. It was a naïve view even by 
eighteenth-century standards. Istvan Hont demonstrated that there 
were debates among Enlightenment thinkers about whether and to 
what degree commerce promoted peace, as well as about the quality 
of peace it created. Some writers compared international-trade 
competition to an unstable equilibrium akin to commercial quasi-
war.57 And Montesquieu himself stressed the complex preconditions 
necessary before nations would be able to come together in 
commercially based confederations.58 Nonetheless Montesquieu 
broadcast optimistic views of the English Constitution and the 
relationship between international commerce and world peace. 
He also drew two distinctions that became increasingly 
influential as the eighteenth century moved toward the nineteenth. 
First, he suggested that there was or should be some kind of 
 
 53. Economical commerce was based on “reciprocity and competitive advantage,” 
while luxury commerce served “the fantastic consumption demands of a small ruling 
class.” Robert Howse, Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace, 31 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 693, 702 (2006). 
 54. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, §	12, at 323. 
 55. Cf. Howse, supra note 53, at 708 (arguing that readers “should not project onto his 
sober spirit the actual project of world government or a universal liberal society. But, 
without some such conception, his contentions about the relationship of commerce, war 
and peace collapse into a set of contradictions, paradoxes and tautologies”). 
 56. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XI, §	20, at 182. 
 57. HONT, supra note 10, at 186–87. 
 58. Howse, supra note 53, at 698 (noting that Montesquieu observes that there are “a 
diversity of laws, both over time and among different political communities at a given 
time, which would at face value make any project depending on legal harmonization or 
integration seem utterly unrealistic”). 
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separation between commerce and ordinary politics.59 Second, he 
divided politics into constitutions, on the one hand, and daily 
governance, on the other.60 Montesquieu also connected these 
distinctions to the English Constitution.61 Embedding commercial 
welfare in fundamental law, along with the exclusion of some 
dimensions of commerce from the ken of ordinary legislators, was a 
plausible inference. In other words, the ancient idea of fundamental 
law carried into the Enlightenment on the back of theory that tended 
to insulate healthy “economical commerce” from rent-seeking 
politics. It would not take much to start packing economic liberties 
into constitutional forms. As lawyers attempted to do so, the 
merchants’ chapter remained alive. 
C. Proximate Authority: Blackstone’s Gloss on Magna Carta and 
Montesquieu 
When William Blackstone glossed Magna Carta in his 
Commentaries on the Laws of England two decades later, he invoked 
both Coke and Montesquieu.62 Magna Carta “gave new 
encouragements to commerce, by the protection of merchant 
strangers,” he noted in his spirited celebration of English legal history 
at the end of the Commentaries.63 “Indeed, the law of England, as a 
commercial country, pays a very particular regard to foreign 
merchants in innumerable instances.”64 He enjoyed noting 
Montesquieu’s celebration of the merchants’ chapter65 and then 
flaunted his own learning, and demystified the merchants’ chapter, or 
at least Coke’s exceptionalist version of it, by observing that the 
reciprocal treatment of resident merchants during wartime 
seems to have been a common rule of equity among all the 
northern nations; for we learn from Stiernhook, that it was a 
maxim among the Goths and Swedes, “quam legem exteri nobis 
 
 59. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, §	7, at 321. 
 60. See id. bk. XX, §	11, at 323; §	18, at 325–26. 
 61. Montesquieu may have derived this distinction between the constitution and 
government as separations in government power from Bolingbroke. See Robert Shackleton, 
Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the Separation of Powers, 3 FRENCH STUD. 25, 37 (1949) 
(“Montesquieu’s general attitude to England was coloured by Bolingbroke’s views.”). For 
Bolingbroke’s distinction between constitutions and government, see DANIEL J. 
HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 37–38 (2005). 
 62. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *260–62. 
 63. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425. 
 64. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *260. 
 65. Id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016) 
2016] MAGNA CARTA FOR THE WORLD? 1617 
posuere, eandem illis ponemus.” [The same law that foreign 
powers have shown us, we should observe to them.]66 
That appeared to be a local rule of interstate comity, much like the 
guarantees that modern nations could obtain through treaties. In sum, 
the notion of reciprocal treatment of foreign merchants in wartime 
had long circulated in the European world before Magna Carta. The 
barons and King John had not invented it. 
However, Blackstone drove home the point that it was one thing 
for a nation to pledge commercial reciprocity in treaties with trading 
partners and another to promise it gratuitously and unilaterally in a 
constitutional document. “[I]t is somewhat extraordinary, that it,” 
meaning the principle of wartime reciprocity, “should have found a 
place in magna carta, a mere interior treaty between the king and his 
natural-born subjects.”67 The sociability of the English Constitution 
was yet additional proof of its uniqueness. And the principle was 
more Teutonic than Roman: it derived from northern European 
practice rather than the ius commune. Indeed the Romans, 
Blackstone claimed, had a very different approach to commerce. 
They, 
in their manners, their constitution, and even in their laws, 
treated commerce as a dishonorable employment, and 
prohibited the exercise thereof to persons of birth, or rank, or 
fortune: and equally different from the bigotry of the canonists, 
who looked on trade as inconsistent with christianity, and 
determined at the council of Melfi, under Pope Urban II, A.D. 
1090, that it was impossible with a safe conscience to exercise 
any traffic, or follow the profession of the law.68 
For Blackstone, the English embrace of commerce marked a salutary 
divergence from the two major (and related) continental legal 
traditions: Roman and canon law. Yet all of Europe was the 
beneficiary. 
For Montesquieu and Blackstone, the merchants’ chapter 
reflected the commercial progress that had helped move European 
civilization out of a barbarous age. The medieval guarantee promised 
 
 66. Id. (internal citations omitted). Johann Stiernhook was a Swedish legal writer in 
the seventeenth century who wrote as an institutionalist in the continental tradition, a 
tradition to which Blackstone tried to conform. See generally John W. Cairns, Blackstone, 
an English Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the Nation State, 4 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 318 (1984) (discussing how Blackstone’s Commentaries reflected trends in 
the continental tradition). 
 67. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *260. 
 68. Id. at *261 (internal citations omitted). 
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in the charter between the barons and King John was transformed 
into something larger by Enlightenment legal thinkers struggling to 
work out the complex relationship between commerce and 
international relations. None of these writers documented how, or 
even whether, the merchants’ chapter played a pivotal role in specific 
controversies, or whether it had autonomous force as a motive for 
official action in any real situation. These writings were 
jurisprudential, or didactic and moral exercises, rather than concrete 
legal or especially historical investigations. As such, they all circulated 
freely in early America.69 
The story of the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta in the 
Enlightenment was not, however, just about moral philosophy, 
jurisprudence, and theory. Constitution-makers in the late eighteenth 
century debated many interesting jurisprudential and moral concepts. 
At the same time, they also built legal institutions that had significant 
consequences for real people. Putting aside the question of whether 
the merchants’ chapter or its early modern gloss in the form of the 
general reciprocity principle ever had motivating force in English 
international affairs, elsewhere it did play at least a supporting role in 
vigorous debates over the degree to which a new, post-colonial 
society should be open to foreigners and their money. 
III.  FOREIGN MERCHANTS AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMERCE 
A contagion of constitution-making spread across the Atlantic 
world for two generations after the American Revolution.70 At the 
same time, commerce also continued to expand across the Atlantic 
world and beyond. Almost everywhere, constitution-makers—
drafters, ratifiers, readers, and implementers—grappled with the 
 
 69. On the circulation of Coke’s Institutes in the early United States, see James Haw, 
John Rutledge: Distinction and Declension, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE 
JOHN MARSHALL 70, 82 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (quoting John Rutledge’s claim 
that Coke’s Institutes were “almost the foundation of our law”). On Montesquieu’s 
readership in early America, see PAUL MERRILL SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 
1760–1801 (1940). On the circulation of Blackstone’s Commentaries, see Paul D. 
Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 527 (1990) (discussing the influence of Montesquieu and Blackstone’s works in early 
American legal education); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New 
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976) 
(discussing Blackstone’s impact on American politics, courts, and legal education). 
 70. For the explosion of constitution-writing after the American Revolution, see 
Linda Colley, Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776–1848, 32 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 237 (2014). For the similar rise in declarations of independence after the 
American Revolution, see David Armitage, The Contagion of Sovereignty: Declarations of 
Independence Since 1776, 52 S. AFR. HIST. J. 1 (2005). 
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problem of foreign trade and capital and how, or to what degree, 
constitutions ought to structure and protect foreign commerce. Some 
of those constitution-makers sought to open their economies from the 
foundation up; others were more skeptical. But almost everywhere, 
issues concerning foreign trade and foreign capital were on 
constitution-makers’ agendas. 
In the early United States especially, access to and regulation of 
foreign trade and capital were salient issues in the ratification debates 
over federal legislative power, the treaty power, and the federal 
courts. Pre-war debts were on many minds, and so was the need for 
increased trade and capital to shore up the finances of the new 
nation.71 Such problems also motivated Antifederalists to demand, in 
the Bill of Rights, the guarantee of a jury in civil cases: a jury of native 
peers who would not only protect individual debtors but also pluralist 
sources of law.72 Domestic and diplomatic controversies concerning 
foreign trade and investment remained salient in the 1790s, as Europe 
broke into continent-wide wars over the French Revolution. 
Throughout the federal government, in the courts as well as in the 
political branches, the problems of foreign credit—whether to attract 
it, where to seek it, what to do with it, and how to control it—shaped 
the ways that the founding generation began to interpret the new 
Constitution and construct the federal government. 
A. Judicial Interpretation of Creditors’ Rights: The Brailsford Case 
The ink was barely dry on the ratified Federal Constitution when 
proto-partisan debate began over how it applied to international 
commerce and finance. The Brailsford case became one of the earliest 
cases argued in the new Supreme Court, only the fourth to reach 
judgment, and the first (and one of only a few) to culminate in a jury 
trial in the Court itself.73 Again, the case began when the British 
 
 71. See ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, 
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 11–21 (1993); MAX M. EDLING, A 
REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 149–90 (2003); E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE 
POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776–1790, at 179–
219, 289–305 (1961). 
 72. On the jury as a pluralist source of law, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON 
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 96–97 (1975); SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE 
JOHN MARSHALL 5–6, 48–49 (1990).  
 73. See 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 73. The Supreme Court rendered three decisions in 
the case over two years; the third and final judgment is here counted as the fourth 
judgment in the Court’s history. The Court entered two default judgments in other cases 
that would have gone to trial had the state defendants appeared: Oswald v. New York, 
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creditor sued his Georgia debtor in federal circuit court for a pre-war 
debt.74 Georgia moved to interplead because, it claimed, it had 
confiscated the debt during the Revolution and feared that the 
defendant would not adequately protect the State’s ownership 
interest.75 
The merchants’ chapter did not fit the case well. The dispute 
involved debts, rather than merchandise, owed to some merchants, 
like Brailsford, who were outside Georgia and even North America 
during the war. A chapter written for medieval resident merchants 
trading goods was refitted onto early modern transatlantic credit 
networks. Before the Revolution, agents of English and Scottish 
creditors could sue freely in colonial courts to collect debts, or sue 
against the person, property, or guarantor of colonial debtors located 
in Britain.76 In the 1780s, these foreign agents had limited recourse to 
the state courts, several of which were inhospitable to debt collection 
suits either because of statutory obstructions, judicial rulings, or jury 
nullification.77 But now the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed them to sue 
in the new federal courts, with the rule of decision coming from either 
state law or, when applicable, federal law, treaties, or the 
 
Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 5, 1795 (unreported) and Cutting v. South Carolina, 
Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 8, 1797 (unreported). See 5 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800, at 62, 458–59 
(Maeva Marcus et al. eds., Columbia Univ. Press 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC]. 
 74. The federal circuit courts had 
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of 
a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds 
[$500], and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or 
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of 
another State. 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §	11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The $500 minimum amount in 
controversy requirement was a significant bar to suits for modest debts. 
 75. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 76. This right to sue in any court in the British Empire that had subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction over the matter flowed from another imperial reciprocity principle, 
the one that gave subjects equal access to all the King’s courts, in any dominion. See 
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward 
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 456 (2003). 
 77. Virginia, for example, passed statutes forbidding British creditors from suing in its 
courts until Britain met its obligations under the Treaty of Peace. See, e.g., An Act to 
Repeal So Much of All or Every Act or Acts of Assembly as Prohibits the Recovery of 
British Debts, in 12 GEORGE COCHRAN, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 528, 528 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823) 
(passed Dec. 12, 1787) (purporting to repeal disability on suits by British creditors but 
suspending the Act until Britain complied with Article VII by returning or paying 
compensation for slaves). 
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Constitution.78 This was just one example of a prominent theme in 
early American legal history: as imperial relationships became 
international, Federalist reformers reconfigured colonial legal and 
commercial practices into new federal institutions.79 
In the Brailsford case, the circuit court judges, Justice James 
Iredell and Judge Nathaniel Pendleton, both invoked the reciprocity 
principle of the merchants’ chapter to help find that Georgia had not 
confiscated the old debt.80 The judges parsed Georgia’s statute to find 
that its drafters had distinguished debts owed to British merchants 
residing in Britain from those owed to British subjects in Georgia.81 
This was a plausible reading of awkward statutory language.82 
Because Brailsford had resided in Britain throughout the war, the 
Circuit Court concluded that the legislature had only sequestered, but 
not confiscated, the debt owed to him.83 
The statute did not clarify why the legislature drew this 
distinction. Judge Pendleton supposed that that legislature might have 
distinguished creditors abroad for a number of reasons. One was the 
sense that many merchants in Britain opposed the war against their 
American trading partners.84 Another was that the legislators passing 
the 1782 statute foresaw that creditor rights would be central to the 
peace treaty and wished to set them aside from confiscation.85 In 
addition, the legislators might have been influenced by the general 
principle that “debts contracted on the faith of commercial 
intercourse ought to be deemed of a sacred and inviolable nature.”86 
Elaborating the last supposition, Pendleton reminded his American 
audience how debt between colonists and metropolitan merchants 
 
 78. For the purpose of alienage jurisdiction, see Tarter & Holt, supra note 7, at 259. 
 79. See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 61, at 203–58. 
 80. Iredell’s opinion credits one of Brailsford’s attorneys in the Circuit Court 
proceeding for introducing the chapter during oral argument. James Iredell’s Circuit Court 
Opinion, supra note 15, at 105. 
 81. See id. at 104–05. 
 82. See, e.g., id. Section five of the Georgia statute provided that debts owed to 
“merchants and others residing in Great Britain should be sequestered” rather than 
confiscated, though it did not define sequestration. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 96. The next 
section confiscated the real and personal property of British subjects, except that owed to 
merchants in Britain, which instead was to be sequestered. Id. at 93, 96. 
 83. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra note 15, at 112. The judges also 
analyzed the legal difference between sequestration, which was akin to holding property in 
trust for the creditor-beneficiary, and confiscation, which transferred title to the State. 6 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 98–99. 
 84. Id. at 96. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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had facilitated imperial trade.87 It could do so again—outside the 
Empire. Interpreting the statute as merely sequestering these debts 
would promote reconciliation and a resumption of that trade. That, 
too, he supposed, might have been in the minds of Georgia’s wartime 
legislators. It was at this point that Pendleton invoked the second part 
of the merchants’ chapter, whereby in wartime “the merchants of the 
inimical country shall be attached, without injury to their persons or 
goods,” until it was known how the enemy was treating English 
merchants in its country.88 “Perhaps,” concluded Pendleton, “this wise 
and equitable provision in favor of commerce might have suggested 
to the framers of the Confiscation Act the idea of this distinction.”89 
Supreme Court Justice Iredell, then riding circuit in the southern 
states, likewise invoked the merchants’ chapter to “illustrat[e]” the 
legal distinction between confiscation and sequestration.90 He also 
invoked Montesquieu’s “high eulogium” of the merchants’ chapter to 
help explain why “every one must admit” the reasonableness of 
distinguishing between resident Loyalists, who “basely betrayed their 
Country,” and British creditors abroad, who played no role in the war 
and even “used the greatest efforts to prevent it.”91 Then Iredell 
addressed the law of nations. The traditional allowance under the 
laws of war for belligerent powers to confiscate enemy property, even 
debts, was something like a trump card for the debtor and Georgia. 
Iredell admitted that the customary law of nations did not prohibit a 
nation at war from confiscating the debt owed to subjects of its 
enemy.92 Yet the “modern practice in Europe” was not to confiscate 
debts in wartime, and Britain respected that practice during the 
Revolution: it had not confiscated American debts.93 The law of 
nations was becoming more liberal, these Federalist judges argued, 
though only beginning to catch up with the protection guaranteed in 
Magna Carta. 
 
 87. Id. at 100 (supposing that the treaty-makers considered the debts owed to real 
British subjects to have been “contracted on the faith of commercial credit” and thus 
inviolable). 
 88. Id. at 97 (“Magna Charta, a law well known in America, declares, that, in case of a 
war, the merchants of the inimical country shall be attached, without injury to their 
persons or goods, till it is known in what manner English merchants are treated in that 
country.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra note 15, at 105. 
 91. Id. at 106. Iredell elided the distinction between Loyalists who had not made 
themselves “Citizens” of Georgia and other British subjects who had not. Id. 
 92. Id. at 105–06. 
 93. Id. at 106. Of course there were few debts owed to Americans by Britons to 
confiscate in the first place. 
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Because both Pendleton and Iredell admitted that the law of 
nations traditionally permitted belligerent states to confiscate debts, it 
was crucial for them, as it had been for Brailsford’s attorneys, to 
argue that the State had not confiscated debts. A holding that 
Georgia had not confiscated Brailsford’s debt would avoid the more 
difficult question of whether it had the power to do so and, if so, 
whether the Treaty of Peace nullified that forfeiture.94 Here is where 
the merchants’ chapter did real work. The chapter, along with the 
liberal trend in the law of nations of exempting debt from 
confiscation, enabled Brailsford’s lawyers to contend that Georgia 
had behaved liberally during the war, whether or not it possessed the 
ultimate power to expropriate debts. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the interpretation of the Circuit 
Court below: Georgia had sequestered but not confiscated the debt.95 
When peace returned, under the law of nations, a foreign creditor 
could return to seek collection. The Treaty of Peace’s prohibition of 
additional “impediments” further protected the creditor’s right to 
obtain satisfaction. In the trial between Georgia and the creditor in 
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Jay charged the jury 
accordingly. Although newspapers reported that he told the jury that 
it possessed the power to determine law as well as fact, he strongly 
instructed the jury that the Justices unanimously agreed that Georgia 
had not confiscated, but rather only sequestered, the debts owed to 
Brailsford.96 Consequently, “his Right to recover them revived at the 
peace bot[h by] the Law of Nations & the Treaty of peace.”97 
 
 94. Justice Iredell, rehearsing his dissent in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 
(1796), indicated that the Supremacy Clause could not be invoked to reverse state actions 
taken before the Constitution’s ratification. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra 
note 15, at 112–13. 
 95. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 77. 
 96. See Fragment of John Jay’s Charge to the Petit Jury, reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 170, 170; DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 17, 1794, as reprinted in 6 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 171, 173 (reporting Jay’s jury charge). 
 97. Fragment of John Jay’s Charge to the Petit Jury, supra note 96, at 170. A 
newspaper reported that Jay told the jury it could decide law as well as fact. See DUNLAP’S 
AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 96, at 173. For a recent Note arguing that the case 
involved the application of the law merchant as applied by a special jury of merchants, see 
Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 211 
(2013). Although the lawyers and judges in Brailsford did analyze the laws of war and the 
Treaty of Peace, they did not mention the law merchant, which concerned peacetime 
commercial transactions rather than wartime confiscation of debt. In addition, the special 
jury did not appear to bring expert wisdom to the case. Instead, after Chief Justice Jay 
charged the jury with strong and clear statements of the Court’s view of the governing 
legal rules, the jurors interrupted their deliberations to ask the Court to specify once again 
the two major issues and the Court’s view of the relevant law on those issues—to Jay’s 
annoyance. See DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 96, at 174. Jury selection 
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Apparently that unvarnished instruction was not clear enough. 
Later that day the jury submitted two questions to the Court. The first 
asked whether sequestration “[v]est[ed] the State of Georgia 
completely with the debts,” and the second asked, if sequestration 
had vested title in Georgia, whether the treaty “or any other cause” 
revived the creditor’s right to recover.98 Jay explained that his charge 
had covered the ground of both questions already and repeated that 
the Justices believed that Georgia’s statute had not vested title to the 
debts in the state.99 As to the second and more difficult question, Jay 
did not answer. Instead, he simply stated that “no sequestration 
divests the property in the thing sequestered.”100 So instructed, the 
jury found that Georgia had only sequestered and not confiscated 
British debts. Brailsford had finally won.101 
The extension and elaboration of the merchants’ chapter in the 
Brailsford case cannot stand for the proposition that the federal 
courts unequivocally protected the rights of foreign merchants, even 
the subset of British merchants who enjoyed explicit protection in the 
Treaty of Peace. At exactly the same time that the Supreme Court 
decided that it would permit Georgia to interplead in the case against 
Brailsford, it also held, in Chisholm v. Georgia,102 that the citizen of 
another state—including a foreign citizen or subject—could sue a 
state, here again the State of Georgia.103 In other words, the states did 
not enjoy sovereign immunity and could be sued in the federal courts. 
 
by a Federalist marshal probably had more to do with the jury’s judgment than the nature 
of their employment as merchants (though the two characteristics probably overlapped). 
On Federalist jury selection, see Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury 
and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997 (2007); Tarter & 
Holt, supra note 7. Moreover, historians are increasingly skeptical that the early modern 
law merchant was actually a coherent body of law generated by merchants. See, e.g., Emily 
Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1153–59 (2012). 
 98. Questions Proposed by the Petit Jury, reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 171. 
 99. See 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 87. 
 100. DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 96, at 174. 
 101. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 5 (1794). Brailsford’s legal victory did not 
mean he could easily collect the debt. He sought execution for several years and 
eventually recovered only part of what he was owed. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 87–88. 
 102. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Chisholm decision came down the same week as 
the decision that the Court would hear the Brailsford case. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 83 
n.58. 
 103. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 431. Article III of the Federal Constitution provides 
jurisdiction in the federal courts for suits “between a State and Citizens of another State,” 
“foreign States,” or “[foreign] Citizens or Subjects,” and the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 
did not clarify this ambiguous formulation. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §	2; Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, §§	11–13, 1 Stat. 73, 78–81. 
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Chisholm led to grumbling among the states and proposals to 
amend the Constitution to prevent at least some suits against states.104 
Congress did not, however, muster a supermajority to send an 
amendment to the states in the winter of 1793.105 Then, in February 
1794, the jury returned a verdict for Brailsford in the Supreme Court, 
and one week later the Court determined final damages in the 
Chisholm case.106 It was one thing for a state to decide to sue in the 
Supreme Court and risk loss, as in Brailsford. It was another for a 
state to be sued in the Supreme Court as an involuntary defendant—
and lose. When Georgia lost to the British creditor in Brailsford on 
the merits and one week later received the damages judgment in 
Chisholm, complaints about involuntary suits against states in federal 
court cascaded into constitutional reform to protect state sovereign 
immunity.107 The reason was not just the sense of offended dignity. In 
addition—and previously unknown in American constitutional 
history—Chisholm involved the claim of a creditor of ambiguous 
loyalty.108 “Nothing remains but to give the key to our treasury to the 
Agents of the Refugees, Tories and men who were inimical to our 
Revolution,” complained a Boston newspaper in the months between 
Chisholm and the final Brailsford decision.109 Federal jurisdiction over 
state wartime behavior would force states “to distribute the hard 
money, now deposited in that office, to persons of this description.”110 
The argument is not that Brailsford was the final straw. Instead, the 
jury verdict in Brailsford and the damages determination in Chisholm 
fitted with other cases filed against the states, not least a notorious 
 
 104. For an examination of the reaction to Chisholm, see generally James E. Pfander, 
History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998). 
 105. 5 DHSC, supra note 72, at 597. 
 106. See 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 83 n.58. 
 107. For the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, see 5 DHSC, supra note 72, at 596–
604. 
 108. The standard narrative of the facts in Chisholm is recited in 5 DHSC, supra note 
72, at 127–28. Newly discovered sources complicate the conventional understanding of the 
case’s origins. The Scottish merchant whose estate sued Georgia in the Chisholm case 
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British-controlled Charleston after 1780, where he entered a partnership with other British 
merchants; evacuated with the British military in late 1782 and left for British East 
Florida; and applied for citizenship in South Carolina in 1783. The contract at issue in 
Chisholm appears then to have been a composition for damages. Table of Events, 
Trezevant v. Mortimer, In Chancery ([1840?]), S.C. Historical Soc’y (copy of manuscript 
on file with author). Chisholm will be explored in another article explaining how 
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 109. Communications, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 16, 1793, at 3, col. 2. 
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case brought by an exiled Loyalist to recover damages from 
Massachusetts for goods confiscated from his mansion during the 
war.111 When combined, these cases starkly displayed to the state 
governments the potency of Supreme Court jurisdiction.112 
In sum, Brailsford raised a substantial bar against finding that a 
state had successfully confiscated at least some loyalist property, and 
it came on the heels of Chisholm’s holding that individuals (including 
foreigners such as British subjects) could sue the states for debts in 
the Supreme Court. The combination terrified the states. States that 
had confiscated loyalist and British property began to fear that their 
targets would return from hiding, enter federal court, and reopen 
cases that the states believed had been settled with finality years 
earlier. Within a month after the Brailsford decision, Congress passed 
the Eleventh Amendment to close the federal courts to suits against 
states by any individuals, domestic or foreign, and the states ratified it 
the next year.113 The upshot was that alien merchants and creditors 
still had access to federal courts when suing U.S. citizens, which is 
what they most wanted. However, they no longer had the option of 
suing the states directly. 
B. Creditors’ Rights in the Political Branches in the 1790s 
The degree of protection owed to foreign merchants and 
creditors was not a matter only for the early federal courts. Congress 
and the Executive grappled with it as well. In those branches, also, the 
merchants’ chapter was a useful authority for Federalists who wished 
to protect international capital from national politics. 
The degree of protection due to foreign capital was a central 
issue in the partisan debates that raged during the 1790s, and indeed 
to the development of what some historians call the first party 
system.114 Some American constitution-builders like Alexander 
Hamilton began to conceptualize the field of commerce as a space 
 
 111. Vassall v. Massachusetts (U.S. 1793) is unreported, but case documents are 
published in 5 DHSC, supra note 72, at 352–449. 
 112. Cf. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1938 (describing the Eleventh Amendment as a 
compromise and “diversionary” maneuver to stifle calls for a new constitutional 
convention, while preserving federal court jurisdiction over treaty-based cases arising from 
state courts). 
 113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Whether the amendment prohibited all suits, 
including those arising under federal law, treaties, and the Constitution, or only those 
based on diversity jurisdiction, has been much mooted. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 104, 
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MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 195–208 (1993). 
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outside normal politics, a field structured by the high politics of 
constitution-making and at least partly immune from the normal, low 
politics of everyday governance.115 Directly or indirectly, Hamilton 
was following ground that Montesquieu had mapped a generation 
earlier.116 Others, like Thomas Jefferson, agreed that international 
trade was central to the new nation and its constitutional structure. 
However, they believed that the hydraulic pressure of international 
reciprocity was now so intense and unavoidable that the United 
States could compel foreign states to alter their trade and military 
policies by threatening to cut off their commerce with the United 
States. Economic sanctions, including penalties against foreign 
merchants, became new, indeed revolutionary, diplomatic technology 
for reducing the probability of war. 
The same year that the Court decided Brailsford, the newly 
organized Jeffersonian Republicans drove a package of economic 
sanctions against Britain through Congress.117 After the outbreak of 
the wars of the French Revolution, Britain began vacuuming up 
neutral commerce on the high seas.118 Turning the reciprocity 
principle almost on its head, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson 
argued that nations trading in the Atlantic world were now so 
interdependent, or at least so dependent on American trade, that 
boycotts and embargoes would almost instantly force Britain to 
respect U.S. grievances. “Peaceable coercion” was an alternative to 
war. “I think it will furnish us a happy opportunity of setting another 
precious example to the world,” Jefferson wrote to James Madison, 
then serving as his point man in Congress, in March 1793, “by 
shewing that nations may be brought to do justice by appeals to their 
interests as well as by appeals to arms.”119 He then recommended that 
Congress initiate trade embargoes with belligerent nations, a proposal 
that would have gotten nowhere had he suggested it in President 
Washington’s cabinet in the spring of 1793. “I should hope that 
Congress instead of a denunciation of war,” Jefferson continued, 
would instantly exclude from our ports all the manufactures, 
produce, vessels and subjects of the nations committing this 
 
 115. This is a major theme in The Defence, essays published in 1795–1796 to defend the 
Jay Treaty against Republican criticisms in Congress. See infra notes 133–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 118. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 303–449. 
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aggression, during the continuance of the aggression and till full 
satisfaction made for it. This would work well in many ways, 
safely in all, and introduce between nations another umpire 
than arms. It would relieve us too from the risks and the 
horrors of cutting throats.120 
Jefferson had identified the perennial criticism of international 
law: there was no “umpire” between nations when problems reached 
the break point. There was only war. To him, as to many Republicans, 
the increasing economic interdependence among nations offered the 
possibility of a new kind of weapon, socially wounding but not 
bloody. They now saw reciprocity not as an ideal or goal, but instead 
as an economic fact. It was an economic mechanism for preserving 
the old Enlightenment ideal of the balance of power.121 Even if 
nations were not actually balanced when measured by political or 
economic power, they were nonetheless mechanically balanced by 
virtue of their need for each other’s trade. Jefferson was convinced 
that the large European trading nations were especially dependent on 
American commerce because the United States provided crucial 
produce and a necessary market for finished goods.122 Doux 
commerce was now an unbreakable addiction. 
Congress did enact a short-term embargo on trade a year later, in 
1794, amidst uncertainty about Britain’s intentions towards the 
United States as it swept up much neutral commerce in the 
Carribean.123 Some congressmen proposed going farther and 
proposed a complete ban on commerce with Britain and the 
sequestration of debt, including government issued debt in the form 
of Treasury bills.124 The British were becoming large holders of such 
debt, gradually supplanting Dutch investors as the largest group of 
creditors of the federal government.125 Congress did not adopt this 
form of economic sanction, but the idea got a lot of play126—just as 
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Port Bill of 1784, 83 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 288 (1975); Merrill D. Peterson, 
Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783–1793, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 584 (1965). 
 121. Today the balance of power has a realist connotation; in the eighteenth century, 
however, it was an aspirational alternative to “universal monarchy.” See MICHAEL 
SHEEHAN, THE BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY AND THEORY 97–120 (1996). 
 122. See Peterson, supra note 120, at 591–95. 
 123. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 390–95. 
 124. Id. at 392. 
 125. MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES TO 1914, at 34–36 (1989). 
 126. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 392, 394. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016) 
2016] MAGNA CARTA FOR THE WORLD? 1629 
the federal courts repeatedly handed down decisions forcing 
Americans to repay decades-old debts to British creditors.127 
Hamilton was aghast at these proposals, and not only because 
they threatened his financial program, which depended heavily on 
foreign trade and foreign investment in Treasury bonds.128 Indeed, 
most Federalists opposed the provocative Republican policy of 
peaceable coercion and, especially, the prospect of including the 
suspension of public debt obligations in the arsenal.129 In the fall of 
1794, President Washington sent Supreme Court Chief Justice Jay to 
London to negotiate a treaty with Britain to resolve American 
grievances arising from captures of neutral shipping in the French 
wars and those stemming from the Revolution and the Treaty of 
Peace, including the obstacles British creditors like Brailsford faced 
when trying to collect old debts and also Britain’s retention of several 
western forts within U.S. territory.130 Apparently on Jay’s initiative, 
the resultant Jay Treaty also included a provision by which both sides 
promised never to confiscate private or public debt obligations in 
wartime, thereby committing the United States not to include 
Treasury bills or shares of the Bank of the United States in the 
repertoire of economic sanctions.131 Because treaties were the law of 
the land, and it was not yet clear whether Congress could simply 
supersede treaty pledges with ordinary legislation,132 the Jay Treaty 
provision effectively stymied Jeffersonian attempts to employ 
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economic sanctions against British creditors of the federal 
government. 
Explaining the wisdom of this guarantee to the public, Hamilton 
gazed back longingly on the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta, or, 
more accurately, at its Enlightenment gloss, and lamented that he and 
the other constitution-makers had only implicitly, and incompletely, 
accomplished what the barons and King John had done so well. “How 
much is it to be regretted, that our Magna Charta is not unequivocally 
decorated with a like feature,” Hamilton noted wistfully about the 
absence of an explicit provision protecting foreign debt from 
confiscation.133 “[I]n this instance,” he continued, “we who have given 
so many splendid examples to mankind are excelled in constitutional 
precaution for the maintenance of Justice.”134 He then cobbled 
together some clauses from the Federal Constitution to fashion a 
substitute for the missing merchants’ chapter. His central claim was 
that the spirit of the Contract Clause,135 which by its letter only 
prohibited the states from interfering with the obligation of contracts, 
restrained the federal government as well. In addition, it applied to 
the government’s own contractual promises, another controversial 
claim at the time.136 Consequently, Congress could not confiscate 
foreign-held Treasury bonds.137 
Perhaps because of the weakness of this doctrine of implied 
constitutional limitation, or simply to plead in the alternative, 
Hamilton also countered the argument that the law of nations 
empowered states to confiscate debts. In another of his thirty-eight 
public letters defending the Jay Treaty, and as Justice Iredell and 
Judge Pendleton had done during the Brailsford litigation,138 
Hamilton emphasized the modern, pro-creditor trend in the 
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customary law of nations.139 The latest authorities, notably Emer de 
Vattel, embraced the principle that states should not confiscate 
debts.140 On Hamilton’s reading, this principle was not just normative 
but also positive: the modern customary law amounted to the 
principle that belligerent powers could not confiscate debts. Hamilton 
conceded that the United States had “a natural right of War in certain 
cases to confiscate or sequester enemy’s property found within our 
Country; but .	.	. on motives relative to Commerce and Public Credit, 
the Customary Law of Europe has restrained that right as to private 
debts and private property in public funds.”141 The main authority for 
an unlimited right to confiscate derived from Roman law.142 As 
Blackstone had in his gloss on the merchants’ chapter, Hamilton 
expressed contempt for Roman public law. It was the same law, he 
argued, that justified killing all enemies or simply enslaving them.143 
Conquest, not trade, was the main Roman business; “for the most 
part Commerce was little cultivated.”144 Fortunately, “moral science” 
had undergone “improvement	.	.	.	in modern times.”145 Along with 
that improvement came restraints on public authority, at least 
respecting debts owed to foreigners. The modern customary law of 
nations trumped the natural law of nations. 
Hamilton’s attempt to read the protections of the merchants’ 
chapter into the Federal Constitution, along with his strong reading of 
the law of nations,146 was designed to insulate international 
commerce, or at least capital, from the hurly-burly of partisan 
politics.147 Although he rejected Montesquieu’s utopian belief that 
commerce automatically produced peace,148 Hamilton argued that the 
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partial insulation and deft management of commercial relations 
would create gains for all sides involved in international trade. 
Together, constitutional limitations and adroit diplomacy would 
minimize the damage that political conflict between nations might 
inflict on international commerce.149 The capital-starved United 
States especially benefitted from such a system. Here, Hamilton 
reformulated Coke’s realist sociability to fit the unusual financial 
circumstances of a post-colonial and developing nation. 
Post-revolutionary American legal arguments and political 
debates took the centrality of international capital for granted. 
Participants disagreed, however, about whether to insulate it with law 
or make it a weapon of peace. In short, these disputes about the 
relationship between fundamental law and commerce offer insight on 
the constitutional arguments for capitalism as it began to triumph.150 
Some of those arguments derived authority from a medieval provision 
meant to protect commerce from royal prerogatives. Now that 
tradition was reconfigured to restrain democratic legislation. If the 
King could not do it, argued Federalists, neither should the people. 
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTING A FISCAL-COMMERCIAL STATE 
The career of the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta in the early 
Republic demonstrates the enduring power of the medieval charter 
almost six centuries after its drafting, even outside the British Empire. 
It also reveals more. The resonance of the merchants’ chapter for 
Federalists, especially, owed much more to its early modern gloss 
than to King John and the barons at Runnymede. To Coke, 
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, the chapter conveyed the wisdom and 
utility of pledging a nation’s good faith to foreign traders. For them 
all, the chapter illustrated fundamental principles of political 
economy about the virtues of international reciprocity and the 
benefits, all around, of (relatively) free commerce. Many 
revolutionary Americans believed that gloss contained a lesson 
especially important for a post-colonial and developing nation. 
Pledging national faith in constitutional forms would send signals 
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abroad that foreign capital was safe from political manipulation in the 
United States.151 
This episode also sheds light on the broader international 
dimensions of early American constitutionalism. The early American 
constitutions, contrary to the exceptionalist myth of constitution-
making, engaged the rest of the world.152 They were designed and 
functioned to integrate the new states into a larger international 
system, which the process of constitution-making presupposed. Given 
the Enlightenment context for the outburst of revolutionary 
constitution-making and the centrality in the Enlightenment of 
questions of political economy—or the relation between political 
structure and economic development in what contemporaries saw as 
an international and even global economy153—it was inevitable that 
constitution-makers and interpreters debated how to promote or 
channel international commerce. 
The Federal Constitution in particular is filled with provisions 
designed to integrate the United States into the larger world of 
European states, including many clauses that relate to international 
trade and credit.154 It took away all foreign affairs powers from the 
states and distributed many of them to Congress and the Executive;155 
it disabled them from issuing paper money or interfering with future 
contracts;156 it made the peace treaty and protection of existing 
contracts the supreme law of the land;157 and it gave the federal courts 
jurisdiction over cases involving aliens and foreign states.158 
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Amidst the construction of a legal environment hospitable to 
foreign trade and investment, the merchants’ chapter played a 
supporting role in the transformation of that text into constitutional 
governance. In one of the many early cases involving the rights of 
foreigners in America,159 federal judges invoked Magna Carta to 
frame a debatable interpretation of a state statute and protect a 
foreign stream of credit. Soon after, Alexander Hamilton invoked the 
merchants’ chapter when formulating an aggressive interpretation of 
the Contract Clause to apply it to governmental contracts, including 
contracts made by the federal government. And although the 
Jeffersonian Republicans did not agree that international capital 
should be insulated from ordinary politics, they concurred with the 
Federalist premise: the United States was deeply enmeshed in an 
international economy, indeed inevitably so, and its future 
development depended on the openness of that economy. This 
solicitude for foreign trade and investment, and the belief that war 
would stifle American development, casts doubt on the proposition 
that American constitution-makers aspired to create a fiscal-military 
state of the sort supposed to have emerged in early modern Europe.160 
It is better characterized as a fiscal-commercial state. 
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